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THEOLOGICAL INCOMPATIBILISM AND
THE NECESSITY OF THE PRESENT:
A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL ROTA
William Hasker

Michael Rota has identified a problem in my argument for theological incompatibilism, and claims that it also undermines my argument against divine
timeless knowledge. I acknowledge the problem, but show that it is easily
corrected and leaves my arguments unscathed.

I want to begin by thanking Michael Rota for his close examination of my
argument for theological incompatibilism.1 His article provides the occasion for a small but important correction on my part, and also enables me
to clarify some issues. Once the needed correction is made, however, his
arguments do not pose any fundamental difficulty for my position.
He begins his discussion by identifying—correctly, I must admit—an
inconsistency in what I said on this topic in God, Time, and Knowledge.2 Here
is how the inconsistency arises: My definition of free will is as follows:
(FW) N is free at T with respect to performing A =df It is in N’s power at
T to perform A, and it is in N’s power at T to refrain from performing A.3
In explicating this definition, I affirm what I will term Proposition (P):
(P)

In general, if it is in N’s power at T to perform A, then there is
nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which prevents or
precludes N’s performing A at T.4

But this leads to trouble. For if N performs A at T, then it will follow, according to my definition of “hard facts,” that “N performs A at T” is a
hard fact at T. Now if “N performs A at T” is a hard fact at T, it is included
1
Michael Rota, “A Problem for Hasker: Freedom with Respect to the Present, Hard Facts,
and Theological Incompatibilism,” Faith and Philosophy 27.3 (July 2010): 287–305. (Page references in the text are to this article.) As will become apparent, Rota has failed to anticipate my
response to his objection. For the rest, however, his treatment of my work is scrupulously
accurate.
2
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
3
God, Time, and Knowledge, 66; quoted on 288.
4
God, Time, and Knowledge, 67; quoted on 288 (bolding added).
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among the circumstances which obtain at T. But N’s performing A at T
clearly precludes N’s refraining from performing A at T, which means that
it is not in N’s power at T to refrain from performing A at T. And this in
turn means that N is not free with respect to performing A at T. But then,
by parallel reasoning, it will follow that N is never free with respect to performing any action whatsoever. For at a given time T it will be true either
that N is performing A or that N is refraining from performing A,5 but in
either case N will lack the “two-way power” which, according to (FW), N
must have in order to be free with respect to performing A. This, however,
is inconsistent with my frequent assertions that we humans do, in fact,
have free will in a great many situations.
The difficulty arises, of course, from the bolded words “at T,” which
occur in the sentence, “if it is in N’s power at T to perform A, then there
is nothing in the circumstances that obtain at T which prevents or precludes
N’s performing A at T.” Delete those words, and the contradiction disappears. For regardless of what N is doing at T, this need not in general
either prevent or preclude N’s performing A at some time subsequent
(perhaps immediately subsequent) to T. So this is the correction that is
required, which though small in extent is indeed crucial.
Rota goes on to restate his argument in a slightly different form, and
further insight can be gained by examining this version. Here the crucial
premise is
(7) For some human agent N, some act A, and some time T, N performs A
at T, and N is free at T with respect to performing A. (290)

From this, once again, the contradiction follows. For if N performs A at
T, the proposition “N performs A at T” will be a hard fact with respect to
T and will be included among the circumstances that obtain at T. And it
will follow, as before, that N lacks the two-way power that, according to
(FW), is required if he is to be free at T with respect to performing A. Rota
acknowledges that I have not explicitly endorsed (7), and considers the
possibility that I might reject (7), affirming instead
(10) For some human agent N, some act A, and some time T, N is free at T
with respect to performing A. (290)

(10), unlike (7), does not entail that N is free with respect to performing A
at the very time when she is performing that action, and so the contradiction is
avoided. Rota proceeds to show, however, with the aid of proposition (P),
that I am committed to (7) and not merely to (10), so this way out is not
available to me so long as I affirm (P).6
5
If N is unconscious or otherwise incapacitated at T we might have scruples about saying
that N is “refraining from performing A.” In that case, however, it will surely not be true that
N is free at T with respect to performing A.
6
A point of clarification: To the best of my knowledge, I have never endorsed (7), nor
have I ever accepted such a proposition as being true. The fact remains, however, that given
other assumptions I accept, I am committed to accepting (7) so long as I affirm (P) with the
inclusion of “at T.”
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Having established the contradiction, Rota proceeds to explore some
possible ways of avoiding it. Among these, he devotes considerable space
to the possibility of rejecting (7), affirming (10) in its place. Indeed, he
provides a plausible rationale (though one he does not himself accept) for
making this move:
While doing A at T, N doesn’t have the power (at T) to refrain from doing A
at T. For by the time T is present, N is doing A. But given this, N cannot at T
exercise a power to refrain from doing A—it’s just too late for that. And if N
cannot exercise at T a power to refrain from doing A at T, then (given what is
meant by ‘power’ in this discussion) N does not have at T a power to refrain
from doing A at T. (291)

Furthermore, Rota quotes Suarez as attributing this very same view to
several important medieval philosophers:
Ockham, Gabriel, and other nominalists teach that with respect to an act
that it is already exercising, the will is not free at the very instant at which it
exercises that act, except either in the sense that (i) the act proceeds from the
freedom and indifference that the will had immediately before that instant
or in the sense that (ii) at the instant in question the will has the power to
desist from the act in the time immediately following that instant, even if all
the other conditions or causes that concur for the act persist . . . . The Master
[Peter Lombard] seems to embrace this position in Sentences 2, dist. 25, chap.
2, where he says that free choice has to do not with the present or the past
but with the future.7

I have to say that I find this reasoning entirely congenial, and I welcome
the support of Ockham, Gabriel, and Peter Lombard for what seems to
me to be to be evidently the right way to think about this matter. Perhaps
a small illustration will help to illuminate the issue. Suppose I am freely
engaging in a conversation with you. Suddenly it occurs to me that I ought
not to be saying to you what I am in the process of saying. Maybe the
content is inappropriate (what I am telling you is a secret that needs to be
kept), or maybe I should not be talking at all right now (we are attending a
concert together, and the conductor has lifted her baton in preparation for
the opening chord). So I cut myself off, perhaps in mid-sentence, perhaps
in a mere fraction of a second. How quickly I stop talking depends both
on the urgency of my becoming silent and on the interval that is required
for my volition to assert its control over my vocal cords. What I cannot do,
however, is bring it about that I am not talking to you at the very instant
in which the need for silence occurs to me. As the rationale provided by Rota
rightly says, it’s just too late for that. Or in Peter Lombard’s words, “free
choice has to do not with the present or the past but with the future.”
Rota, however, disagrees, and offers an ingenious argument, inspired
by Suarez, for the view that (7) should be accepted. He poses a forced
alternative: “either (a) nothing created exists except when it is temporally
7
Francisco Suarez, On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), disputation 19.9.1; quoted on 292.
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present, or not (a)” (p. 293). (Of the alternatives, I affirm that (a) is true,
for reasons that will appear later.) Now, suppose that what is true is the
contradictory of (7), namely
(11) For any human agent N who performs an act A at some time T, N is not
free at T with respect to doing A at T. (293)

Rota proceeds, “Next, if N is not free at T with respect to doing A at T, then
it seems that we should say that A is not a free act at T” (293). But if (a) is
true, the act A exists only while it is being performed, and if it is not a free
act at that time it is not a free act at all. “Thus, given (a), (11) appears to
imply that there are no free human acts” (293).
In response, I propose that we consider what should properly be meant
by saying that A is a free act. (FW), I claim, gives a good account of what
it is for a person to be free with respect to performing some action, but it
is a distinct question what it is for an act to be free. In this connection, I
suggest we look once again at the quotation from Suarez. According to
the philosophers he cites, the will is not free in the sense of (FW) at the
very instant at which it is acting. However, these philosophers mention
two other ways in which the will may very well be free at that instant,
namely “the sense that (i) the act proceeds from the freedom and indifference that the will had immediately before that instant or in the sense that
(ii) at the instant in question the will has the power to desist from the act
in the time immediately following that instant.” These two alternatives (or
the combination of the two) specify, I want to say, what is properly meant
by saying that the act in question is a free act. The combination is nicely
illustrated by the example of my freely conversing with you. My talking
to you is the result of a free decision, for which alternatives were available
(I could have chosen to study the program notes rather than talking with
you), and I am free to stop talking at any moment. To ask for more than
this—that is, to ask that (7) should be true in this case—is to insist that, in
order for the act to be free, it must be possible for me to bring it about that
at the very instant when I realize that my present action of talking to you is
inappropriate, it should already be the case that I am no longer talking with
you. And that is surely absurd.8
Rota, however, observes that the proponent of divine timelessness has
reason to object to (11), because its analogue for the divine case will be
false. A timeless God has no temporal sequence in the events of his life. So
if, when God performs an action A, he is not at that very instant free with
respect to performing the action, it follows that God is not free at all or at
any time. And that, surely, cannot be accepted.
Given the assumption of divine timelessness, this reasoning is correct.
However, it is widely recognized that, in speaking about God, we need
to recognize a relation of logical or explanatory priority even in cases where
8
Note that it is by no means sufficient that my speaking should cease at the very instant in
which I realize I should not be talking. That would require an instantaneous response that is
beyond the power of any human being, but it still is not enough to satisfy (7).
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there is no temporal priority. Thus, divine middle knowledge is “middle”
precisely because, in the logical or explanatory order, it stands “between”
God’s “natural knowledge” of the necessary truths, and his “free knowledge” of the propositions that are true in virtue of his own free creative
activity. There is, however, no temporal succession as between these aspects
of the divine knowledge. If we designate the stages in this logical or explanatory order as Moments, we can state an analogue of (11) as follows:
(11*) For any timeless divine agent G who performs an act A at some
Moment M, G is not free at M with respect to doing A at M.
This of course leaves it open that at some previous Moment M* G is free
with respect to doing A at M, even though there is no temporal separation
of M* from M. It seems, indeed, that the proponent of divine timelessness
would be well advised to affirm (11*), and to hold that the Moment in
which God exercises his free will is distinct from, and prior to, the Moment in which he performs his creative action(s). This is so because the
Moment in which God exercises his choice is a Moment in which there
are for God open alternatives, but in the Moment in which he carries out
his creative action(s) one such alternative has been selected and the others
rejected; God cannot be in both of these contradictory states at one and
the same Moment.9 In any case, human beings certainly cannot acquire
knowledge, deliberate, and act in the same temporal instant, so in their
case there is no good reason to reject (11), or to accept (7).
I undertook to show that, given the correction as noted above, Rota’s
argument fails to pose a problem for my argument for theological incompatibilism. This I believe has now been done, so I will not discuss his suggestions for alternative ways to remove the contradiction. I do want to say
something about his response to my argument against Anselmian eternalism. At this point, however, not much more remains to be done on that
front either. In my paper, “The Absence of a Timeless God,”10 I contend that
“Anselmian eternalism” (the view that combines divine timelessness with a
four-dimensionalist view of time) negates the alternative possibilities that
are essential for free will. Following Rota’s numbering, I contend that
(17) If a human agent T’s future action exists (in its full concrete particularity) in the divine eternity, then alternative possibilities for
N’s action at that future time have been eliminated.11
In support of this, I claim that the following two propositions describe
situations that are categorically impossible:
9
If the timeless God is conceived of as responding to the actions of created agents, the situation becomes more complicated, but the main point at issue here will not be affected.
10
In God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle and David M.
Woodruff, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 182–206.
11
299; see “Absence” 197–198. Rota is quite correct, by the way, in noting that my attitude
towards divine timelessness has hardened considerably since the publication in 1989 of God,
Time, and Knowledge. One lives and, hopefully, learns.
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(18) There are things that God timelessly believes which are such that it
is in my power, now, to bring it about that God does not timelessly
believe those things.
(19) There are future actions of my own which timelessly exist in the
divine eternity which are such that it is in my power, now, to bring
about that those actions do not exist in eternity.12
Rota offers ingenious arguments to the effect that (17) is false and (18) and
(19) are both true.13 However, all of these arguments depend on proposition (7), which I have repudiated and against which there is, I believe, a
conclusive objection: I cannot, at a given time T, have the power to bring
it about that a situation which already obtains at T does not obtain at T.14 So
I invite the reader to consider (17), (18), and (19) on their own merits, and
on that basis to reach a conclusion as to whether divine timeless knowledge (in the Anselmian or any other version) is consistent with libertarian
free will.
Huntington University

“Absence” 198; quoted on 299.
Here Rota’s defense of Anselmian eternalism differs from that of Katherin Rogers. She
admits that (18) and (19) cannot be true, but maintains that there are nevertheless alternative
possibilities for created free agents. For comment on Rogers’s view, see my review of her
Anselm on Freedom in Religious Studies 49.4 (December 2009): 499–504.
14
I may, of course, be able to bring it about that the situation in question no longer obtains
immediately after T; I surmise that it is from this fact that (7) (as well as my ill-fated proposition P) derives whatever plausibility it may seem to have.
12
13

